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ABSTRACT
Standard neoclassical welfare economics justifies competitive profit 
maximization as the appropriate objective of a firm. Yet when income is being 
redistributed by lump-sum transfers in order to achieve distributive justice, the firm’s 
owners and managers are not entitled to keep anything beyond those “normal” profits 
which are payments for services rendered. With private information, however, profit 
maximization need not be so desirable even at prices reflecting social values. Indeed, 
even inefficient production can often be justified. And the appropriate distribution of 
profits is more complicated, since some of it is deserved by the firm’s owners as a 
form of incentive payment. The last part of the paper considers how these arguments 
change in intertemporal economies. It is also argued that valuing freedom for its own 
sake may make profits more acceptable than would otherwise be the case. Even so, 





















































































































































































50. Sed incidunt, ut supra dixi, saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati 
videatur, ut animadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an possit cum honestate coniungi. Eius 
generis hae sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus Alexandrea Rkodum magnum 
frumenti numerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia et fame summaque annonae cantate, si 
idem sciai complures mercatores Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas 
petentes Rhodum viderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo 
venditurus....
54. Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quae ipse norit, ceteri ignorent, 
pestilentes sint et habeantur salubres, ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes, 
male materiatae sint, ruinosae, sed hoc praeter dominum nemo sciât; quaero, si haec 
emptoribus venditor non dixerit aedesque vendiderit pluris multo, quam se venditurum 
putarit, num id iniuste aut improbe fecerit.
57. . . .  Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodios nec hic aedium venditor 
celare emptores debuisse. Neque enim id est celare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu 
scias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire.. .  .
From: M. Tulli Ciceronis (Cicero), De Officiis (Book III)
50. But, as 1 said above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to 
clash with moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether their 
conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The following are problems o f this 
sort: suppose, for example, a time o f dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at 
fabulous prices; and suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo o f grain from  
Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other importers have set sail 
from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has sighted their vessels laden with grain and 
bound for Rhodes; is he to report the fac t to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel 
and sell his own stock at the highest market price?....
54. Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on account o f  
certain undesirable features o f which he himself is aware but which nobody else knows; 
suppose it is unsanitary, but has the reputation o f being healthful; suppose it is not 
generally known that vermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is 
built o f unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows about it except the 
owner; i f  the vendor does not tell the purchaser these facts but sells him the house for far  
more than he could reasonably have expected to get for it, I  ask whether his transaction is 
unjust or dishonourable.
57. I  think, then, that it was the duty o f that grain-dealer not to keep back the 
facts from  the Rhodians, and o f this vendor o f the house to deal in the same way with his 
purchaser. The fac t is that merely holding one's peace about a thing does not constitute 
concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from  
finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to know it.....
Translated by Walter Miller for the Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1913), extracts from pp. 318-327.
1. Introduction and Outline
The conference organizers had originally suggested that I should discuss the 
moral status of profits which arise because of asymmetric information. Actually 




























































































time during the period 46-43 B.C.) in his essay on “The Conflict between the Right 
and the Expedient.” He makes it clear that there had been an earlier debate between 
Diogenes of Babylonia and his pupil Antipater. I shall return to this old topic, but 
only in connection with some very general issues concerning the role of profits and 
other rewards in an economic system — especially a system that can succeed even 
when there is asymmetric information in the economy. This is the subject of the 
“modem welfare economics” which appears in the title I have chosen. Before getting 
to that, however, I shall say something about how I shall interpret both “morality” and 
“profits.”
1.1. Morality in Economics
Ethics seems to be a peculiarly difficult branch of philosophy. On the whole it 
is easy to understand why most economists would prefer to stay well clear of it. Yet 
ethics is important to welfare economics because obviously there is no way of 
avoiding it if we are to give our evaluations of economic systems and policies or our 
recommendations for improvements any ethical force or content. Without ethics, 
welfare economics is reduced to, at most, propositions about how to give people more 
of what they seem to want, without any presumption that this would actually be 
ethically desirable. For example, this leaves the economist unable to say that it would 
be wrong to provide what drug-addicts or alcoholics appear to want.
Economic welfarism is a particular and very special ethical value judgement. It 
judges economic systems solely on the basis of what goods and services individuals 
are able to enjoy, and of what labour services and resources they are required to 
supply. Indeed, it assumes that: (a) in the end, it is only the allocations of goods, 
services, and tasks to individual consumers and workers which is ethically relevant; 
(b) individuals behave in a way which maximizes their own welfare —  in the sense 
that they choose what it is right for them to have, provided that nobody else is 
deprived as a result. Part (b) involves what is often called “consumer sovereignty” — 
it is assumed that consumers behave in a way that reveals their preferences, and also 
that they prefer what it is better for them to have. Denying this is a form of 
paternalism, of course.
This particular value judgement of economic welfarism has become standard in 
welfare economics and in most discussions of economic policy. What is being left out 
are many ethical considerations which may be important even in economics, such as 




























































































(potentially) corrupt bureaucrats, and tax systems which are far too complicated for 
even most intelligent and well trained people to be able to understand fully. This 
desire to have freedom for its own sake will be discussed later in Section 10. 
Meanwhile, I am willing to accept at least provisionally the ethics of economic 
welfarism on the grounds that, in connection with economic policy reform and the 
design of economic systems, there are so many other pressing issues worth discussing 
which may be more important. Also, economists obviously have a much greater claim 
to expertise about the effects of policy changes upon economic welfare than about their 
effects upon any more general ethical values.
A particular form of economic welfarism which I shall not be using, however, 
is total wealth maximization. This is a commonly used criterion for making the 
interpersonal comparisons which are usually required in order to be able to compare 
different economic policies. The criterion involves simply adding up different 
individuals’ indices of real wealth, or some alternative monetary measures of well­
being. Then that policy is recommended which would make total wealth as large as 
possible. In this way different individuals’ gains and losses are simply reduced to 
monetary values, and then get added up in order to determine the total net gain, which 
must be equal to the (net) increase in total wealth. No attempt at all is made to see how 
gains and losses are distributed between rich and poor, or between individuals who 
are less or more deserving. This procedure therefore amounts to “one dollar, one 
vote” instead of “one person, one vote.” It is a very particular way of making 
interpersonal comparisons on the basis of wealth alone. It equates the extra money 
which a rich man wants to spend on a superior bottle of wine to the same sum of 
money which a poor mother needs in order to buy medicine which will save the life of 
her child. For this reason, most people would clearly find it ethically unacceptable. 
You may notice that I have carefully avoided calling it an “ethical” criterion. Yet too 
many economists in the past have become accustomed to making interpersonal 
comparisons in this way. Indeed, it is precisely this kind of value judgement which 
lies behind the usual comparisons of economic performance simply on the basis of 
GNP or national income statistics.
Actually, a rather weak form of economic welfarism will suffice for most of 
the arguments contained in this paper. All that they require is the usual Pareto criterion 
based on consumers’ own preferences (i.e., consumer sovereignty) but supplemented 
by some concern for distributive justice. In particular, the ethical claims that I shall 




























































































individuals’ preferences and seeks to avoid extremes of poverty and degradation, even 
among a minority of the population. No specific social welfare ordering is assumed, 
however.
1.2 Profits and Other Rewards
Before proceeding further, I should now say something about what “profit” 
will mean throughout this paper. It will not necessarily be one of those measures of 
profit which accountants are expected to report and which governments tax, 
adulterated as they are by somewhat arbitrary provisions for depreciation and for 
valuing a firm’s capital equipment. Indeed, as Griffiths (1986) for one has pointed 
out, accountancy standards are extremely lax over how to treat many important 
components of firms’ profits, and about what to include in measures of profit and 
earnings. Nor will “profit” be the usual economists’ ideal of “supernormal” or 
“abnormal” profit, which is what is left over after excluding those “normal” profits 
which accountants would include, even though they actually represent payments for 
some of the firm’s inputs such as its financial resources and the (efforts and skills of) 
its management.
All such attempts to define profit as some kind of residual, or to give it some 
justification, are rather too subtle for the points I want to make, however. In fact, on 
grounds of relative easy observability, profit in each single time period will here be 
regarded as simply the company’s net cash flow — or the difference between income 
received and expenditure incurred within that time period. Of the normal profits 
discussed above, this only excludes actual payments for services rendered. This cash­
flow measure of profit also excludes the payment of taxes, but includes dividends. 
Then, however, intertemporal models still present serious problems in defining 
profits, because cash flows in different periods and in different events have to be 
weighed against each other in order to determine the total contribution of a firm to its 
shareholders and to the economy as a whole. This will be discussed in Section 7 
below.
In fact, as was discussed previously, in economics it is natural to make 
judgements on the basis of allocations of goods and services. Profits, therefore, 
matter to the extent that they affect such allocations. Profits’ effects can be direct, 
such as when a producer who sells at a higher price earns a higher profit which is then 
really a transfer of resources from buyer to seller. Profits can also have indirect 




























































































individuals and firms who take labour and other resources which others are willing to 
supply, and then convert them into goods which others wish to buy. Even the indirect 
effects, however, arise because profit seekers anticipate the transfers which constitute 
the direct effects of profits.
It follows that profits matter because they are transfers. So it is really the 
dividends that are actually paid to the owners of the company which should be counted 
as profits, and not any retained earnings which are used to finance investments 
intended to generate profits —  or dividends — in the future. Moreover, the distinction 
between normal and supernormal profits is not after all so important. Either is a form 
of payment, or transfer. It is true that one is a payment in exchange for a specific 
service, whereas the other is a residual after all inputs have been paid for. Yet it will 
turn out that the arguments to be advanced below do not need this distinction to be 
maintained at all. They suggest instead that payments generally are right if and only if 
they improve the allocation of resources. Such improvements may occur because 
there is more distributive justice. Or, as is more in accord with traditional neoclassical 
economic theory, the payments or transfers associated with profits have favourable 
incentive effects. They can make the allocation of resources more efficient by 
encouraging resource owners and producers to increase their supplies, and by 
encouraging consumers and firms to limit their demands.
What this suggests is that profits do not need to be regarded as morally 
different from many other kinds of payment. The right way to judge profits is 
essentially the same as the right way to judge royalties, professional earnings and 
salary payments, rents, interest payments, even wages. Either they do or do not 
improve the allocation of resources, both directly and also indirectly through incentive 
effects. That is why I have chosen to add, “and Other Rewards,” to the title. And 
why “profits” will mean “profits and other rewards” for most of the rest of the paper.
There are important implications which follow from this simple observation. It 
matters how profits are earned because the activities that earned them may or may not 
have been morally desirable. The profits earned from producing penicillin have a 
different moral status from those earned by producing cocaine. It matters who earns 
the profits, since profits earned by the deserving poor are not the same as those 
received by the wealthy owner of a large company who has inherited it all and never 
contributed anything to its management. It even matters how profits are spent — 




























































































Stanford University seem much more acceptable than those which are spent on 
excessive amounts of alcohol, even by somebody who is otherwise poor and 
deserving.
1.3. Issues
After these preliminary remarks, I would like to distinguish between two 
important and separate ethical questions: (a) should firms be encouraged to make as 
much profit as possible? (b) should firms and their owners be allowed to keep those 
profits which do result from their production and trading activities? There are, 
however, a number of important subsidiary questions which would also have to be 
settled in the course of a complete discussion. Of these, two which relate to (b) are: 
(c) who should be responsible for making the firm's production and financial 
decisions? And (d) should the people who control the firm, or somebody else, be the 
ones to receive its profits? When the firm is small and is run by a worker/owner who 
is responsible for all its capital and labour, the answer is quite different from when the 
firm has become a large enough organization to have agency problems in its own 
administration. Then profit sharing schemes can have important incentive properties 
in encouraging managers, workers, even customers, to ensure that the firm is being 
well run. Those who supply the firm with capital would seem to have no special claim 
to the firm’s profits, over and above the usual return to suppliers of financial resources 
such as loans. When the firm risks failure, and the financiers’ stakes are therefore 
also at risk, this should certainly be taken into account. But so should the limited 
liability of shareholders — and even the limited exposure of those who are partners in 
a firm with unlimited liability, since they also receive some protection from bankruptcy 
laws.
Another subsidiary question is considerably more subtle. Of course, for 
profits to be maximized in any reasonable sense, a necessary condition is that the firm 
must be making efficient use of its inputs in producing its outputs. And it is easy to 
show that, if all firms are maximizing profits taking as given the same set of “producer 
prices,” all of which are positive, then there is aggregate production efficiency. That 
is, the production sector as a whole is using its inputs and organizing its outputs in a 
way which implies that it would be impossible to increase the total output of any good 
or service without decreasing some other output or else increasing total inputs, and it 
would also be impossible to reduce the total input of any good without substituting 




























































































turns out that the following question needs to be considered: (e) is it desirable that the 
production sector as whole, or at least the typical firm, should organize its production 
efficiently? For even this question may have a much more subtle answer than has yet 
been widely recognized within the economics profession.
Having posed these five questions, they will be discussed eventually in their 
logical order, which is first (a), then (e), and finally (b), (c), (d) as a group. That is, I 
shall begin with the desirability of profit maximization, or at least the weaker property 
of production efficiency. The distributional issue of who should receive the profits 
earned by a firm is left until last, following the usual (and usually mistaken) separation 
of efficiency and distributional issues in public economics.
Before these main questions can be considered properly, however, it is 
necessary first to introduce the reader to some of the subtleties involved in what I have 
chosen to call “modem welfare economics”. This label is used to describe recent work 
on the theoretical principles of economic policy, taking into account the reality that 
policy makers will naturally be ill-informed about the relevant tastes, endowments, 
and opportunity sets of economic agents — information that is really essential in 
bringing about any allocation of resources which is optimal in the traditional sense. 
Particularly because this work is being addressed to readers whose first specialization 
may not be economics, a non-technical summary of recent ideas seems in order. Let 
me comfort those who wonder if their economic background may be inadequate by 
pointing out that such a background may not always be helpful, since it has been my 
experience that most members of the economics profession have yet to adjust their 
thinking to the new insights which it seems to me that this work can provide. Let me 
also freely admit that to a large extent I shall merely summarize ideas already 
expounded more extensively elsewhere (see Hammond, 1979, 1985, 1987, 1989a, 
1990a, b, c, d).
1.4. Outline
For this reason, Sections 2 and 3 below begin by reviewing the two neo­
classical “fundamental efficiency theorems of welfare economics.” These are what lie 
behind the usual justification for the role of profits in the economic system which is 
provided in most textbooks and most courses in microeconomics, even at the graduate 




























































































Thereafter Section 4 considers how limited information gives rise to additional 
“incentive constraints” restricting the set of possible economic systems which can be 
used to allocate resources. As many economists have remarked following the work of 
Samuelson (1954, 1955), such constraints arise in connection with public goods 
because of the “free-rider” problem. But they also seriously limit the policy 
instruments that can be used to move the economy around what is usually thought to 
be its Pareto frontier — instruments that are certainly needed in order to remedy excess 
poverty or other instances of distributive injustice. Indeed, incentive constraints even 
change the proper notion of Pareto efficiency and so shrink the Pareto frontier, except 
at those few points (actually only one, if competitive equilibrium happens to be 
unique) where no attempt is made to redistribute resources. Once this becomes 
recognized, it seems at first that almost all links between perfect competitive markets 
and Pareto efficient allocations become severed.
Section 5 goes on to argue that markets generally exert a negative influence on 
the economic system. This is because they put further constraints upon those schemes 
of quantitative controls, rationing, price control, taxation, etc. which are likely to be 
typical of an incentive constrained Pareto efficient economic system. Really one needs 
to expand the set of incentive constraints, and so shrink the relevant Pareto frontier 
even further. This is in order to allow for the difficulty or expense in preventing 
individuals using tax evasion, black markets, etc. in order to subvert controls on their 
trading behaviour.
These theoretical preliminaries would seem to suggest that the usual neo­
classical case for having firms maximize their profits and then pass them onto their 
capitalist owners rests on extremely shaky foundations. The incentive constraints due 
to private information force us into a kind of second-best world —  or even third-best, 
bearing in mind the constraints which markets themselves can create. Because of 
negative results such as those due to Little (1957) which were later formalized by 
Lipsey and Lancaster (1957), it might therefore be thought that nothing at all would 
remain of the standard argument for profit maximization, or even for production 
efficiency. Nevertheless, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) were able to produce a very 
powerful argument for the desirability of production efficiency, and also for profit 
maximization at suitable producer prices. A generalized version of this argument is 
considered in Section 6. A condition for it to work in any great generality is that all of 




























































































restrictively, that any extra profits which result from increased efficiency must be 
confiscated, so that dividend payments after tax remain unchanged. This leads to the 
paradox that (increases in) supernormal profits can only be justified as a desirable 
target for a firm if those who create them are not allowed to keep any of them.
Up to now, the discussion has been concerned solely with a static economy. 
This severe restriction has been all too common even in modem welfare economics for 
the simple reason that sequence economies seem only too likely to add to the vast 
complications without yielding many new insights beyond those of some rather special 
models. Yet some general ideas may finally be beginning to emerge, of which a few 
are briefly considered in Section 7. Unfortunately the attempt to extend the discussion 
to intertemporal economies raises one last particularly vexing question: (f) what 
exactly is the definition of the profits which we may be wanting firms to maximize?
Another important restriction is the almost exclusive use of equilibrium 
models. This is another rather questionable feature of modem welfare economics. It 
can only be justified by the continuing lack of suitable disequilibrium models which 
are general enough to allow the effects of policy changes to be analysed 
comprehensively. Section 8 attempts to consider the extent to which the role of profits 
may be stronger in economies which do not adjust quickly and automatically to 
equilibrium. Section 9 recapitulates the mainly negative results that precede it 
concerning the role of profits in helping to ensure a truly efficient allocation of 
resources, bearing in mind all the restrictions upon an economic system which arise 
because of asymmetric information.
Section 10 finally considers an entirely different case for a profit-driven 
economic system allowing a considerable degree of laissez faire. This is that the direct 
costs of interfering in the economic system with an army of tax collectors, customs 
officers, inspectors, and other kinds of bureaucrat, may well exceed any benefits from 
an improved allocation of resources. This is particularly true if we heed the natural 
desire of most individuals to lead their own lives without undue interference from state 
officialdom. This accords profits a very low moral status, however. They are only 
justified to the extent that we find it impossible to devise a better economic system 
which relies much less on profits.




























































































2. The First Efficiency Theorem
And so it is back to profit — that virtue in itself — and the quest for profit, which 
knows no bounds and grabs wherever there is something to be had, with the law o f the 




The efficiency theorems of welfare economics set out the logical connections 
between perfect competitive equilibrium allocations on the one hand, and Pareto 
efficient allocations on the other. Here “perfect competitive equilibrium” signifies an 
allocation resulting from complete markets for all the goods and services which 
individuals are interested in. Producers take market prices as given; then they carry 
out production and trading plans which maximize their profits. Consumers take market 
prices and their shares of producers’ profits as given; then they carry out consumption 
and trading plans which maximize their preference orderings. Also, there must be 
equilibrium prices which balance consumers’ and producers’ demands and supplies of 
each good. Note especially how consumers and producers must neglect whatever 
monopoly power they may actually have to influence market prices.
“Pareto efficient” allocations of goods and services in the economy are defined 
as those having the property that there is no way to make all individuals better off 
simultaneously. Actually, this is the weak concept of Pareto efficiency; it is more 
customary to use a slightly stronger definition requiring that nobody can be made 
better off unless somebody else is made worse off.
The first of the two efficiency theorems appears to be extremely powerful. It 
demonstrates that perfect competitive markets produce (at least weakly) Pareto efficient 
allocations in all circumstances when they achieve a general equilibrium of demand 
and supply. No other qualifications are needed. The result is strong because the 
hypothesis that markets have reached perfect competitive equilibrium is so strong. In 
addition, in order to guarantee that the stronger concept of Pareto efficiency is always 
fulfilled, it is necessary to make one assumption regarding individuals' preferences. 
They must be “locally non-satiated” in the sense that, no matter what consumption 
bundle a consumer has, there is always a small change which takes the consumer to a 




























































































Smith's notion of the “invisible hand.” It also appears to justify the pursuit of non­
monopoly profits, since that is what competitive behaviour on the part of firms 
amounts to. Moreover, there is no reason to deprive individuals who own firms from 
enjoying their full share of any profits which the firm succeeds in making.
22 . Market Failure
Although logically it is certainly very powerful, from an ethical point of view 
the first efficiency theorem by itself is neither interesting nor attractive. For suppose 
first that all individuals were identical and had the same wealth. Then there would 
certainly be no distributional concerns to worry about. Even so, the ethical accept­
ability of a perfect competitive market allocation would still rest on the important value 
judgement that individuals’ preferences correspond to what it would be desirable for 
them to have. Denying this value judgement, of course, smacks of paternalism and 
suggests that suppressing individual liberties may be justified. Yet in fact most 
people I know could cite many instances where they thought it would be better if 
individuals’ preferences did not have to be accepted as sovereign.
The first efficiency theorem carries even less ethical weight when it is 
recognized that individuals are actually quite diverse. This is because the distribution 
of wealth and power may be ethically inappropriate or even quite obnoxious. 
Bergstrom (1971), for instance, showed how perfect competitive markets with slavery 
can be Pareto efficient. The same is true of dictatorship, or of a distribution of wealth 
so unequal that most individuals are unable to survive for more than a short period — 
see Coles and Hammond (1986). Not even perfect markets can remedy distributive 
injustice by themselves.
So far, nothing specific has been said about public goods and externalities. 
These are commonly described as “market failures” because perfect competitive 
markets need not bring about an efficient allocation when they are present. It is true 
that in theory markets could be supplemented by similar Lindahl pricing schemes for 
determining the quality of the environment, including the provision of public goods. 
Rather more plausibly, there could also be Pigovian taxes and transfers to determine 
the extent to which each producer and consumer is allowed to affect the quality of the 
environment, either adversely or beneficially. In a sense, such arrangements amount 
to making sure that markets really are complete. Pigovian taxes amount to charges for 
the right to create pollution or to behave in other ways that affect other people 




























































































what they are willing to pay at the margin for the public goods from which they 
benefit. Measures of profit, and dividends paid out, should be decreased to allow for 
such charges, or increased to account for any benefits which the firm may create. In 
this way the economy will function as if there were perfect markets even for public 
goods and externalities, so Pareto efficiency is restored.
Another kind of market failure arises in connection with monopoly. This 
creates inefficiency in two ways. One, which has been well understood for many 
years, is that monopolists who seek higher profits can do so by restricting their output 
in order to drive up the prices of their products. Such inefficiencies can be overcome 
by encouraging effective competition, or by putting ceilings on monopoly prices so 
that the price is lowered and the output increased to that which would occur in a 
competitive market, or even by subsidizing the monopolist’s output in a way that 
encourages it to produce the competitive output. A second source of inefficiency may 
be more important, however. Because monopoly power brings in additional profits, 
firms and individuals are encouraged to devote resources to establishing or 
maintaining their monopoly power. These resources are worse than merely wasted, 
since they are used up in a way that actually worsens the allocation of the goods and 
services that remain. Obvious examples include much advertising expenditure, and 
some research and development that is designed not to improve the firm's product so 
much as to make it more difficult for other firms to compete. Less obvious but equally 
important examples include some barriers to entry into professions protected by 
various forms of legislation —  for example, the need to qualify by passing 
examinations based on knowledge which will probably never be used. Really these 
inefficiencies arise from “rent-seeking” behaviour such as that described by Tullock 
(1967), Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1982).
Notice that the monopoly profits themselves do not create inefficiencies. 
Rather, the waste arises from the way in which monopoly power leads to distorted 
markets and “directly unproductive” or wasteful behaviour. Monopoly profits often 
add to distributive injustice, of course, but need not always do so. Many companies 
with monopoly power are actually largely owned by pension funds, with many 
beneficiaries who are not especially well off.
Some profits from externalities and monopolies, however, are so monstrous 
that they can surely be described quite properly as “obscene”. In the quotation above, 




























































































German firms from selling equipment for producing poison gas to Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq. Indeed, companies all over the world continue to make profits from 
selling arms which are used to terrorize populations or wage totally immoral wars. 
Others grossly mistreat their workers. Another extreme example concerns the 
“calculation table for value in terms of profitability of concentration camp slaves, 
which ‘assuming an average life-span of nine months,’ gave a profit of ‘270 x 5.30 
Reichsmarks, a profit increased by rational utilisation of the corpses’.”1
3. The Second Efficiency Theorem
3.1. Market Success
From an ethical point of view, the second efficiency theorem appears much 
more interesting. It assures us that (almost) any Pareto efficient allocation can be 
achieved through perfect competitive markets — provided that wealth is redistributed 
suitably by “lump-sum” transfers which are, by definition, entirely independent of 
individuals’ market transactions or other decisions. In particular, an ethically optimal 
allocation that combines efficiency with distributive justice may well be achievable in 
this way. Moreover, this second efficiency theorem is what really lies behind the 
view of many economists that efficiency and distributive justice can be separated and 
even pursued with quite different policy instruments. General policy tools can be used 
to promote efficiency; lump-sum transfers to promote distributive justice.
Actually, unlike the first efficiency theorem, the second is only true under 
some rather stringent technical conditions which ought to be discussed carefully. I 
shall not do so here, however, but ask the interested reader to consult one of the many 
technical works which set out the assumptions under which the result is true. Very 
briefly, the additional conditions require local non-satiation, continuity and convexity 
of preferences, and also convexity of production possibilities. Even then, some extra 
assumptions are needed to rule out problematic examples in which some consumers 
are on the boundaries of their feasible sets —  see Arrow (1951) and the many later 
discussions of what has come to be known as “Arrow’s exceptional case,” including 
Hammond (1989c).





























































































3.2. The Benefits o f Profits . . .
Where the second efficiency theorem is valid, it clearly allows us still to justify 
competitive profit maximization as the proper goal of a firm, since that is part of what 
lies behind a competitive equilibrium. A direct argument is also possible, in some 
cases at least. Suppose that the economy has reached an allocation resulting from an 
equilibrium of demand and supply in which one or more firms are not maximizing 
their profits, taking prices as given. Then, in the absence of public goods, it would be 
possible to arrange a Pareto improvement as follows.
First, improve the “supply side” of the economy by having firms announce 
new demand and supply functions of prices for which the resulting profit is never 
lower than what they could earn by sticking to their original production plan, and in 
some cases is actually higher. Assume in fact that no matter what the price vector may 
be, there is always at least one firm making more profit than at the original allocation. 
This is true at the equilibrium prices because of the assumption that originally at least 
one firm was not maximizing its profits at those prices. At other prices, however, it is 
not automatically true, so there is an additional assumption here.
Second, specify a lump-sum transfer to each consumer as a function of prices 
so that, together with any profits received from firms, every consumer always has 
more income than is needed to purchase what he was previously consuming. This is 
also possible, given that firms must be earning more profits in the aggregate.
Third, have consumers announce their preference-maximizing demands and 
supplies as functions of prices, taking these transfer functions as given.
Finally, find new equilibrium prices, assuming they exist, and then allow 
firms and consumers to carry out their announced demands and supplies at these 
prices. Because of the way the transfer functions have been constructed, at any price 
vector all consumers can afford something which they strictly prefer to the original 
allocation, and so the resulting equilibrium allocation makes all consumers better off.
This argument is very similar to one which Grandmont and McFadden (1972) 
used to establish rigorously for the first time the validity of the classical propositions 
concerning the gains from international trade. The existence issue is taken care of by 
the standard technical assumptions. For the issues being discussed in this paper, the 




























































































so that nobody is made worse off from the comparative static effects o f having 
producers increase their profits. The benefits of more profitable production cannot be 
assumed to “trickle down” automatically in the absence of some such compensation. 
The Luddites may not have been justified in trying to resist the Industrial Revolution in 
England, but they surely had some legitimate grievances. Too many economists in the 
past have been willing to consider only “potential” Pareto improvements, which occur 
when there are potential lump-sum transfers by which the gainers could compensate 
the losers. This is in contrast with the much stricter test of an actual Pareto 
improvement involving actual lump-sum transfers.
Notice the need to consider new demand and supply functions  for all 
producers and transfer functions for all individuals. This is because compensating 
consumers for price changes affects the income distribution and so typically alters 
equilibrium prices even further. Seeing this, as well as the need to consider whether 
there would exist a new equilibrium which the economy could reach after the change, 
was really the main contribution of Grandmont and McFadden’s work on the gains 
from international trade.
3.3. . . .  to Society as a Whole
As in Section 2, competitive profit maximization therefore remains a desirable 
goal. The difference from Section 2 is that the owners of a firm are no longer 
necessarily entitled to its profits. Suitable lump-sum redistribution may well involve 
taking away most of these profits, and giving them to those most in need. In addition, 
public goods may well have to be financed by levies on all individuals including the 
owners of profitable corporations. Now that efficiency and distributional issues have 
been so successfully separated, there is no particular reason to allow shareholders to 
keep their dividend income. Nor is there any reason either why workers will keep the 
full fruits of their labour, or resource owners the full value of what they own. Indeed, 
there is no reason to respect any form of private property; adapting a famous quotation 
from Karl Marx, it is as though private income is first collected from each according to 




























































































4. Private Information and Incentive Constraints
Although the second efficiency theorem can only be proved under rather 
restrictive assumptions, this is not the main problem with it. Rather, the trouble arises 
from the crucial proviso that wealth should be suitably redistributed by means of 
lump-sum transfers. This is obviously essential if the second efficiency theorem is to 
have more ethical significance than the first. Yet the requisite transfers should 
typically be from those who have sufficient skill and good fortune to prosper on their 
own, toward those for whom life in the absence of transfer payments would be at best 
a miserable struggle. This creates obvious grave problems when individuals’ true 
needs and abilities are unknown, because then the transfer payments could only 
depend on appearances of need or of skill. Individuals who understand this would be 
provided with every incentive to manipulate the transfer system by altering their 
apparent needs or skills. There would be little incentive to work hard, acquire useful 
skills, or be productive, but every incentive to appear needy.
Another problem when there is private information arises in connection with 
the environment, including public goods. In order to determine how clean the air 
should be, or what level of public schooling or health care facilities to provide, the 
relevant preferences of different individuals have to be discovered, as well as the true 
costs of keeping the air cleaner, or of providing the chosen outputs of public goods. 
As Samuelson (1954, 1955) was probably the first to point out, the standard Lindahl 
pricing scheme is unlikely to work well because it charges people their stated marginal 
willingness to pay. This provides an obvious incentive for individuals to “free-ride” 
by understating how much they value public goods. Indeed, at any equilibrium of the 
usual Lindahl pricing scheme, one individual offering to pay one dollar less toward the 
cost of a public good would save himself a dollar, but the total loss to all individuals 
from a reduction in the public good would be only one dollar. This leaves the 
individual who pays one dollar less with a very much smaller loss from the reduced 
provision of the public good, and so a net benefit not much less than a whole dollar.
Previously it was often assumed, at least implicitly, that an economic system 
would have to respect only the physical feasibility constraints concerning both what 
individuals and firms can supply or produce, and the need to balance demand and 
supply. Now it can be seen that there are additional and equally important “incentive 




























































































producers in the economy. The latter constraints require that, whenever an individual 
has some private information which is not monitored directly, the economic system 
must function in a way that does not encourage the individual to conceal or 
misrepresent it. No matter what economic system we think we may be designing, it 
turns out that by the time individuals have manipulated it as they wish, the final result 
must inevitably be a system that respects these incentive constraints. This fundamental 
property of mechanisms which work in the presence of incomplete information has 
come to be known as the “revelation principle”; the economy must function as it would 
if individuals were revealing their private information willingly because they had no 
disincentive to do so.
Taking these incentive constraints into account, the second efficiency theorem 
fails spectacularly. It must be admitted that the relevant incentive constraints may be 
satisfied by some very particular Pareto efficient allocations — namely, those which 
could result from perfect competitive markets if no attempt whatsoever were made to 
redress distributive injustice, and if public goods were entirely financed by means of 
uniform poll taxes which were not so high that some individuals would lack the means 
to pay them (Hammond, 1979). Otherwise, all other “incentive constrained” Pareto 
efficient allocations require interference in and “distortions” of markets in order to 
achieve even a limited amount of redistribution of resources, or some more acceptable 
source of public finance than a pure poll tax. With very rare exceptions likely to be 
met only in theoretical writings, incentive constraints really do bind.
5. Markets as Constraints
The previous section considered incentive constraints due to private 
information concerning needs, abilities, and willingness to pay for public goods. In 
the insurance literature, such private information is often known as “adverse 
selection.” As Akerlof (1970) pointed out, “lemons” are likely to feature more 
prominently among second-hand cars offered for sale than they do among those on the 
roads. The old, infirm, and people with parental responsibilities are more ready to 
buy private health insurance (if they can afford it) than the young, healthy, and 
childless. Bankers are more willing to lend to those who already have plenty of liquid 
assets. Cities, states, and nations which are generous in providing public goods and 




























































































Such incentive constraints are by no means the only ones, however. Others 
can arise because of “moral hazard” or “hidden action.” Lenders may find it difficult 
to get their borrowers to repay, and so demand collateral. Fire insurance companies 
must worry not only about negligence but also arson. Tax inspectors face evasion. 
And deposit insurance corporations are having to face the consequences of having 
insured excessively risky lending practices during the last decade.
When we consider general economic systems, a particular form of moral 
hazard arises. If market transactions could be perfectly monitored and controlled, an 
incentive constrained Pareto efficient economic system would typically involve non­
linear taxation and pricing, possibly some forms of rationing, and a large range of 
similar forms of intervention in the allocation process. In practice, however, market 
transactions can only be monitored and controlled very imperfectly. Rationing 
schemes usually lead to black markets, income taxes to evasion, customs duties to 
smuggling, excessive regulation to corruption. Market forces are powerful, and 
suppressing them is difficult. Accordingly, any description of an economic system 
remains seriously incomplete until it spells out how rationing schemes and other kinds 
of regulation will be enforced, how taxes and duties will be collected, and what will 
happen to defaulters, evaders, and non-payers. The almost inevitable failure of 
markets to achieve distributive justice or to determine a proper quality of the 
environment or allocation of public goods creates a need for non-market remedies; 
these imply that markets can make things worse rather than better by adding to the 
incentive constraints that need to be respected. Markets emerge as constraints upon 
the economic system rather than as desirable instruments for achieving Pareto 
efficiency.
6. Profits as Constraints?
6.1. The Second-Best Case for Profits. . .
Despite all these limitations upon markets as efficient allocators of resources 
when there is private information, there are still cases when it is useful to ask 
producers to maximize profits taking as given some particular “producer” prices. Of 




























































































economies, for goods which producers sell to consumers, producer prices will be net 
of tax, while consumer prices will include taxes. For goods like labour which 
consumers sell to producers, it is the other way around — producers have to pay 
wages which include taxes, but workers only receive wages after tax. Anyway, the 
issue is whether there exists a single vector of producer prices which all firms should 
be asked to use in valuing their inputs and outputs and then to maximize profits. And, 
as pointed out in the introduction, if such uniform producer prices are to exist at all, 
then it must be desirable to have the production sector as a whole produce efficiently. 
Indeed, the desirability of aggregate production efficiency is not only necessary; at 
least when the aggregate production possibility set is convex, being at a point of its 
efficiency frontier is also sufficient for the existence of a “supporting hyperplane” at 
that point, and then the (geometric) normal to that hyperplane will be a price vector 
having components that are appropriate producer prices for all firms to use. This is 
merely a generalization of the “marginal rates of transformation” to be found in most 
elementary economics textbooks.
So, is aggregate production efficiency in fact desirable? Suppose that the 
economy finds itself with an allocation which is not on the efficiency frontier of the 
aggregate production possibility set, but is actually in the interior of this set. Can 
some Pareto improvement be arranged? To see whether it can, try adapting the 
argument for profit maximization presented in Section 3 above. Start by assigning all 
firms new demand and supply vectors so that the aggregate net output of every good is 
higher than it was for the original production plan. This must be possible because of 
the assumption that the original production plan is in the interior of the aggregate 
production possibility set. This first step of the improvement process is actually 
simpler than before, since no demand or supply functions have to be specified for 
firms. The reason is the stronger hypothesis that one can produce more of every good 
in aggregate, rather than just make more profit overall.
The other steps of the process are not nearly as simple, and there will be many 
cases where they do not work at all. In fact, before the remaining steps can be 
described, it is first necessary to specify what prices or alternative market signals will 
be used to overcome any imbalances between demand and supply. Notice that this is 
not presuming any equilibrating process in the usual sense; in order to reach a feasible 
allocation, every economic system must ultimately balance demand and supply, if only 
by an unsystematic rationing scheme that leaves many economic agents frustrated. 




























































































Dreze and Stem (1987, 1990). So I will speak of demands and supplies as being 
functions of market signals', indeed, I will even have to do the same for tax rates and 
other policy instruments.
Then the second step of the move toward a Pareto improvement requires that 
compensating policy instruments should be specified as functions of market signals, 
ensuring that any change in market signals needed to re-establish balance between 
demands and supplies never makes any consumer worse off. In section 3 these policy 
instruments were lump-sum transfers as functions of market prices. In Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1971), Mirrlees (1972), and Hahn (1973), as well as in later work on the 
gains from trade and from customs unions by Dixit and Norman (1980, 1986) and 
Dixit (1987) -— the market signals were both producer and consumer prices. These 
differed from each other because of commodity taxes, which served as the policy 
instruments. As no restrictions were placed on the rates of commodity taxation for 
different goods, a possible compensating policy would adjust these rates in order to 
hold consumer prices constant, even while producer prices were varying. This is 
equivalent to putting a total freeze on consumer prices and wage rates, but then setting 
taxes and subsidies in order to clear markets. It has the effect of leaving each 
consumer with exactly the same budget constraint as originally, so there is no way any 
consumer could become worse off.
The third step of the adjustment process involves making some small change to 
the functions determining how those policy instruments which directly affect 
consumers depend upon market signals, doing so in a way which guarantees a Pareto 
improvement. One can virtually always find an instrument which will work, such as a 
uniform poll subsidy paid to all consumers. One alternative would be reduced taxes 
which lower the consumer prices of some goods which everybody consumes; another 
would be reduced taxes which raise the consumer prices of some goods such as 
different types of labour that everybody supplies. After Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971), a more thorough investigation of the possibilities for Pareto improving tax 
changes can be found in Weymark (1978). Or, instead of tax changes, it may be 
possible to use the increased outputs of the production sector in order to expand the 
provision of some public good which benefits everybody.
Of course, after all these three prior steps, there is still market balance to worry 
about. One possibility is that market signals can be relied upon to remove all 




























































































articles cited above. But even if not, provided that aggregate demand for each 
commodity is a continuous function of market signals, then a small enough change in 
policy instruments will produce a change in aggregate demand small enough to ensure 
that the extra output of every commodity, arranged in step one described above, does 
not get exhausted. The surplus of any good can then be disposed of, if necessary, by 
giving it away to some people who value it.
6.2. . . .  and Its Limitations
Although it is certainly a very powerful generalization of the “managed trickle 
down” argument of Section 3, there are many cases where it will not work. The 
second step can create severe difficulties. Obviously, the set of policy instruments 
may not be powerful enough to allow every consumer to be fully compensated for any 
damage suffered because the aggregate efficiency of production has been improved. 
The model of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) allows different taxes to be levied on any 
pair of different commodities. Bearing in mind that commodities should be 
distinguished by location, this implies that tax rates are allowed to be entirely different 
in different localities. Yet most fiscal systems allow very few different rates of sales 
or value-added tax on different consumption goods. The European Community, 
having already virtually outlawed tax discrimination between different regions of the 
same nation, is now strenuously seeking to “harmonize” value-added tax rates by 
abolishing many of those international differentials that have been allowed to remain. 
As the Regional Program expands, perhaps its direction of specific Community 
expenditure towards poorer areas is becoming more of an acceptable substitute.
Even in the Diamond-Mirrlees model with unrestricted commodity taxation, 
however, there is still a difficulty in arranging suitable compensation at step two. So 
far nothing has been said about what happens to the increased profits which firms will 
make from being more efficient. In the original Diamond-Mirrlees model there were 
either constant returns to scale in private production, implying that there were no 
profits anyway. As an alternative, it could be assumed that profits would be taxed 
away at a rate of 100%. In reality, however, some profits at least typically pass into 
the hands of shareholders, even after the company has paid corporation tax, and 
possibly special taxes on distributed profits, while each shareholder has also paid 
income tax on dividends received. As Mirrlees (1972) showed by means of a simple 
example, these additional profits could make it impossible to generate a Pareto 




























































































then bid up the price of some commodity that absorbs a large share of some poor 
individuals’ budgets, and there may not be enough tax instruments to compensate 
them. It would seem that there also has to be unrestricted profits taxation —  with 
different rates on different firms, moreover, unless the common rate is 100%. In this 
case there is the paradox that profits can only be justified as a desirable target for a 
firm if those who cause them to increase are not allowed to keep any extra!
Perhaps the Mirrlees example is somewhat far-fetched in practice. Even so, 
there are certainly cases when even just making production more efficient in aggregate 
by having more of every output and less of every input will also involve changes that 
disrupt the livelihoods and the lives of some individuals — e.g., by abolishing their 
jobs. There is far too much evidence that the range of tax and other instruments that 
the world’s governments are able and willing to use in such cases is insufficient 
always to provide full compensation to all. Making production more efficient may 
benefit most individuals, but often some inevitably lose as well. Then only 
interpersonal comparisons can establish whether or not the gains outweigh the losses. 
The same is true, a fortiori, of any change which increases producers’ profits. 
Indeed, there are often small gains to virtually all consumers. These have to be set 
against the large losses of the workers, managers, and others who may have 
specialized in selling services to an inefficient or protected firm which is forced to 
close or to reorganize drastically.
Profit maximization is therefore much harder to justify after all when incentive 
constraints and other limitations on the instruments of redistributive policy are taken 
into account. But not quite so much harder as first thoughts might have led one to 
expect. Once profits have been earned, incentive constraints make it rather easier to 
claim that capitalists deserve at least some share of them than was the case without 
incentive constraints. Suppliers of capital, entrepreneurs and inventors are all affected 
by incentives no less than suppliers of labour, and all have private information about 
their willingness to supply, their capabilities, their technical knowledge. But what the 
optimal incentive payment to a capitalist should be is highly complicated. There seem 
to be plenty of good reasons for allowing managers, workers and even consumers to 
receive a significant share of a company’s profits along with its owners and, as 
recipients of profits taxes, the tax authorities. After all, workers who share in the 
firm’s profits have some incentive to be more productive. If consumers also have a 
share in those profits, they may be more willing to offer suggestions which help make 




























































































proportion of the firm’s profits, the firm may be at the mercy of professional investors 
whose only concern is with short-run returns. The firm will find it difficult to pursue 
in secrecy long-run projects of research and development whose costs depress 
earnings in the short-run, but whose long-run expected benefits, to both the firm itself 
and to society as a whole, may be enormous. For these and other reasons, both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic schemes of profit sharing have long been 
advocated —  the works by Weitzman (1984), Dreze (1989), Wadhwani and Wall 
(1990), Smith (1990) form a not necessarily very representative sample of the fairly 
recent literature.
7. Intertemporal Issues
The last five sections have not explicitly considered either time or uncertainty 
about exogenous events. In principle, both can be handled by introducing sufficient 
contingent commodities as in Debreu (1959). That is, the commodity space must be 
extended to distinguish between goods for delivery at different times or in different 
uncertain events or “states of the world”. Not surprisingly, however, there are a 
number of additional complications which this ingenious apparatus does not entirely 
resolve. For one thing, as Tesfatsion (1986) has demonstrated, there are new 
problems surrounding the second efficiency theorem of welfare economics that was 
discussed in Section 3 above. Typically, in any period the optimal transfers to every 
individual will be depend upon their different needs, which in turn depend upon then- 
previous personal histories. Such histories, however, are affected by individuals’ past 
decisions, such as what assets to accumulate, or what skills and habits to acquire. 
Understanding this, individuals will in part choose their personal histories in order to 
improve the transfers to which they are entitled. This being so, the transfers lose their 
lump-sum character, and instead become taxes and subsidies on history which will 
typically create Pareto inefficiencies in the resulting intertemporal market allocation. 
Hammond (1990d) presents a specific example of this phenomenon.
Of rather more interest, perhaps, is what happens to incentive constraints in 
intertemporal economies. In fact, new ones emerge in connection with all kinds of 
loan contract, securities and futures markets, etc. The problem is that borrowers 
engage in contracts which pose a risk of default. Attempting to enforce such contracts 




























































































if this process were perfect, there would still remain some instances where the 
defaulter really is unable to repay. So loan contracts always include, at least 
implicidy, some escape clause allowing the borrower not to repay. Usually, of course, 
the default option is made sufficiently unattractive to prevent it being used, but plenty 
of defaults do actually occur. The need for loan contracts to take such default 
possibilities into account imposes yet more incentive constraints upon a feasible 
economic system, as I explain more fully in Hammond (1989b).
But what of the desirability of profit maximization, or even of production 
efficiency? And of the desirability having a firm’s owners keep a significant share of 
any profit? The rather vague conclusions of Section 6 for static economies are likely 
to hold a fortiori for intertemporal economies. There are additional reasons for lump­
sum redistribution to be infeasible, and additional incentive constraints to take into 
account.
Yet more problematic are the extra difficulties in even defining profits for a 
firm in an intertemporal economy. Economists have become used to considering the 
total present discounted value of an entire stream of future profits. What rate of 
discount to use, however, is not always a question with a straightforward answer. 
Even if it were, there would still be the issue of how to allow for uncertainty. This 
reflects the fact that profits are not well defined, in general, unless there is a market 
price or rate of discount attached to the future returns of the firm at each future date 
and for each future event or contingency. There would be such prices if there were 
“complete markets” in the sense which has become familiar to many economists 
following the important work of Arrow (1953, 1964) and Debreu (1959). When 
markets fail to be complete in this way, however, each firm has to decide how to trade 
off its profits at different dates and in different possible contingencies without clear 
market signals concerning how to do so. It is true that the stock market’s valuation of 
the firm’s prospects could, in theory, provide some useful indication of how its 
shareholders are willing to make this trade off. Accordingly, the firm may try to set 
itself the goal of maximizing its stock market valuation. Yet there are rather obvious 
problems with this because the firm is very likely to have considerable influence over 
the relative implicit prices of its profits at different dates and in different contingencies. 
In other words, the usual competitive price-taking hypothesis makes little sense unless 
there are very many firms producing similar patterns of financial returns in different 
times and in different states of the world. This is the implicit hypothesis, it seems, 




























































































interesting contribution. But by now there is an extensive literature on this vexed 
topic, of which Duffie (1988, ch. 13), Dreze (1989), and DeMarzo (1987) are just a 
few of the most recent works which have struck me as the most important.
This and other difficulties in extending our usual theories to intertemporal 
economies suggest that a new and less ambitious approach may be desirable. One 
possibility is to follow Allais’ (1943, 1947, 1953) example in treating the same 
individual at different dates or in different events as many different dated contingent 
individuals, though each inherits many of the characteristics of some remarkably 
similar predecessors. And also to do the same for firms. Then the intertemporal 
economy has essentially been reduced to a linked series of dated contingent static 
economies, as in Hammond (1990d). The rather negative conclusions of Section 6 
would appear to retain their validity within each of these static economies; now they 
concern the profits which each firm makes at a single date and in a single contingency, 
with the associated concepts of “temporary” or “Allais” efficiency of production and 
consumption in the economy as a whole.
8. Some Omitted Considerations
8.1 Disequilibrium and Austrian Economics
Those “Austrian” economists who follow the ideas of von Mises, Hayek and 
others may legitimately object that the arguments presented above rely too heavily 
upon some kind of equilibrium analysis. In Section 6, I did try to be careful not to 
presume anything like a standard equilibrium concept, recognizing instead that the 
inevitable ultimate balance between demand and supply may come about through 
rather unsystematic procedures. Even so, it probably is correct that we need to 
consider the allocation mechanism in the economy as a form of trading process in 
continuous time which never converges to an equilibrium. Indeed, as Fisher (1983) 
and others have argued, if convergence to equilibrium were to occur, it may well be 
because the pursuit of profit has actually played an important role in the adjustment 
process. But even if such convergence does eventually occur, the effects of trading at 
“false prices” certainly deserve the attention of welfare economists.
Nevertheless, unlike (to my knowledge) most of the “Austrians,” I still think 




























































































providing public goods, controlling externalities, and combating monopoly power. In 
our models, government agencies should not be excluded a priori from making a 
positive contribution to the economic process just because in reality they inevitably 
lack the information needed to make the consequences of their actions fully 
predictable. A proper model of an economic system, it seems to me, should have the 
potential for both public and private agents to interact. Otherwise, of course, it 
becomes far too easy simply to dismiss any kind of policy intervention in the economy 
as at best irrelevant and generally harmful. All the earlier conclusions of Section 6 
regarding the moral status of profit in economies with limited information then appear 
to remain valid. Profit maximization can only be justified at the “right” prices, if at all. 
Yet such prices may never be known unless and until the economic process has 
converged to some kind of equilibrium or more general balance between demand and 
supply. One could well argue that it is better for firms to use some price information 
than none at all, and that the price information which they are most likely to have 
concerns the prices at which they can actually buy and sell. Yet this does not make 
these prices the right ones, nor does it even justify profit maximization at any prices. 
And, of course, there are still only incentive reasons for profit makers to be allowed to 
keep (part of) their actual profits, rather than having them all be taxed away in order to 
use the proceeds to benefit the population of all economic agents as a whole.
8.2. Directly Unproductive Activities
The preceding analysis also presumes that governments and their agents are 
both fairly benevolent and also moderately competent. If they were not, it could be 
argued that, even though policy intervention by federal, state, or local governments 
could in theory do much to promote distributive justice and enhance economic welfare, 
in practice it only serves to make things worse. This seems to lie behind the claims of 
such “conservative” writers as Gilder (1981) and Murray (1984), which may well 
have influenced the Reagan administration’s apparent lack of concern for the increase 
in poverty within the United States.
In fact it seems to me that specifying models which assume purely self-serving 
and/or hopelessly incompetent bureaucrats and politicians may do us all a serious 
disservice by encouraging exactly that kind of contemptible behaviour which they 
describe. And perhaps the failures in America’s anti-poverty programs have more to 
do with a lack of political will to see them working properly. Indeed, it is possible 




























































































undermine the apparent convictions of many Americans that free markets are the best 
way of dealing with virtually any economic problem —  with the notable exceptions, 
that is, of immigration and drug abuse. If such attitudes were to change, one might 
see more sympathetic consideration given to negative income taxes or other sensible 
reforms such as those advocated by Ellwood (1988) and others. One might also ask 
whether the programs of poverty relief in the U.S. seem to perform so badly simply 
because so few resources are devoted to them in comparison with other countries, 
especially those in Western Europe. Esping-Anderson and Micklewright’s (1990) 
recent comparative study is careful not to suggest this explicitly. Yet they cite statistics 
(published by the International Labour Organisation in 1988) for the total of private 
and public expenditure, for all income classes, on all items of social security — 
medical care, all kinds of benefit for sickness, invalidity, employment injury, 
unemployment, old-age, survivors, family, and maternity, as well as public 
assistance. These figures point to how small a fraction (13.8%) of G.D.P. in 1983 
was devoted to all forms of such expenditure in the U.S. compared to West Germany 
(24.3%) or Sweden (33.3%). Since private health care makes up quite a large fraction 
of the U.S. figure, the true discrepancy has presumably been understated by a 
considerable amount. One could argue, I suppose, that the U.S. economy makes 
many more low-wage employment opportunities open to the poor, thus making some 
forms of social security expenditure less necessary. Yet many obvious and well- 
documented gaps remain to be filled before the U.S. becomes anything like a “welfare 
state,” or even one which can take any pride in the way it treats many of its poorest 
citizens.
In the end, however, it clearly is naive merely to assume away the corruption, 
rent-seeking, and other forms of directly unproductive activity (Bhagwati, 1982) 
which certainly bedevil many real polities. Such activities function like external 
diseconomies, in effect. While I cannot (yet) present a full analysis of their 
implications, one is tempted to suggest that their costs could be greatly reduced by 
leaving fewer profits around in uncontrolled hands, where they create both a source of 





























































































9. Profits: a Necessary Evil?
This is about as far as I can go in discussing the role of profits in ensuring an 
efficient and just allocation of resources. The case for profits appears very weak 
indeed. My answer to question (a), regarding the desirability of maximizing profits, 
has been an extremely guarded “Yes, but really only in rather special circumstances, 
depending on what will happen to the profits, how they are measured, what price 
system is used, etc.” The reservations will be fairly familiar to most economists. They 
are generally seen as arising because of possible divergences between social and 
private (marginal) costs and benefits. The divergences due to market failures such as 
unwarranted monopoly power or externalities are widely acknowledged and 
understood. But there are also important divergences due to the lack of sufficiently 
powerful ways to redistribute income in order to abate poverty and promote an 
ethically acceptable level of distributive justice. These have been much less widely 
recognized. Yet they also imply that an ethically appropriate measure of social profit 
may differ considerably from the private profit which is more likely to be the goal of 
actual firms.
The answer to (b), however, concerning whether a firm’s owners are entitled 
to a significant share of the profits, is rather more subtle. In the unrealistic world of 
unlimited information which still fills too large a fraction of economics textbooks, the 
answer has to be, “No, not at all, except as payments for services rendered, which are 
really part of normal rather than supernormal profits.” This was the unambiguous 
conclusion of Section 3. Real economies, however, do have limited or asymmetric 
information. Then, in considering the role of profits in allocating resources 
efficiently, the only reason for firms and their owners to be allowed to keep their 
(supernormal) profits is precisely the need to provide incentives, especially when there 
is asymmetric information. Cicero’s Alexandrian merchant who first reached the 
island of Rhodes with some urgently needed wheat probably deserves much of the 
high price which the inhabitants are willing to pay while they still do not know 
whether other ships are coming (though they are surely likely to guess that there may 
be). But he does so only to the extent that the expectation of such a higher price 
encouraged him to buy and load his wheat as quickly as possible, in order to arrive in 
Rhodes before anybody else. Even then, he should share his profits with the crew 
who have no doubt made exceptional efforts to speed his voyage. As for Cicero’s 




























































































he has neglected, not only is he being dishonest. Perhaps even worse, the reward he 
reaps for his dishonesty provides all sorts of inappropriate incentives for other people 
who hold and eventually plan to sell their houses.
At this point, the reader may be willing to concede much of the above 
argument, but still question whether the issue is quantitatively important. Specifically, 
are there really significant welfare gains to be had from redistributing profit income? 
Especially as Sah’s work (1983) suggests that using feasible redistributive instruments 
like commodity taxes will generate rather small gains in distributive justice, even when 
tailored to suit the worst off participants in an economy? A full answer to this 
question would obviously involve a huge empirical study which I do not have either 
the qualifications, the resources, or the time to carry out. So I can only report on 
some work which bears on the question, but without providing anything like a 
complete answer.
First, Sah’s paper actually has a rather serious limitation. An obvious way of 
improving the lot of the worst off would be to institute some kind of “unconditional 
basic income” such as that suggested by Meade (1989) and van Parijs (1991). 
Somewhat similar is the “negative income tax” considered some years ago by 
Friedman, Tobin and others. Yet Sah’s paper allows only commodity taxes and 
subsidies which thereby relate subsidies to the quantities of subsidized goods that are 
consumed. So somebody whose income is zero and who spends nothing at all 
receives a zero subsidy. Accordingly, Sah excludes what may be the most powerful 
redistributive tool available.
Second, even if first best optimal redistribution of income were feasible, one 
may argue whether it could have a sizeable effect on welfare. Obviously, this depends 
on value judgements concerning what may be expressed in rather crude terms as the 
trade-off between equality and total wealth. At one extreme, if there is no willingness 
at all to exchange any total wealth in order to enhance equality, then first best 
redistribution would make no difference to total wealth, and attempts to redistribute by 
feasible taxation schemes could only lower it. At another extreme one may make 
assumptions like those in Jorgenson’s (1990) 1987 Presidential Address to the 
Econometric Society. There he argues (pp. 1031-2) that, while real consumption per 
head in the United States grew at an average rate of 2.51% per annum for the period 
1947-1985, an equity corrected welfare based measure of the standard of living in the 




























































































that even the rather limited measures that various governments in the United States 
have undertaken to enhance distributive justice have succeeded in adding 0.41% to the 
annual average growth rate of equity adusted consumption per head over a period of 
almost forty years. In fact, consumption expenditure per capita, in 1982 dollars, rose 
from $3750.81 in 1947 to $9724.02 in 1985 or by a factor of 259%. Jorgenson’s 
equity index, however, also rose from 0.5800 to 0.6782 (where 1.00 would indicate a 
fully equitable distribution). This equity index is defined so that the welfare-based 
measure of the standard of living is obtained by multiplying real consumption 
expenditure per capita by the equity index. Accordingly, this standard of living, again 
measured in 1982 dollars, rose from $2175.62 in 1947 to $6594.94 in 1985, or by a 
factor of 303%. It may be worth noting finally that almost all the increase in 
Jorgenson’s equity index occurred during the years 1958-78, during which time it 
rose from 0.5678 in 1957 to 0.6737 in 1978.
While there are very many special and even highly implausible assumptions 
that lie behind these calculations by Jorgenson, they do make the point that the effect 
of good redistributive policies on welfare could turn out to be significant. After all, 
there are ways of doing the calculations which show that the welfare effects of actual 
redistributive policies are equivalent to an increase in the annual growth rate from 
2.51% to 2.92% sustained over a period of four decades.
10. Liberty as an Objective
“Humanity has not yet developed anything more efficient than a market economy.
. . The prerequisite to ensure the effective functioning o f the market [includesI de jure 
equality o f all types o f property, including private property . . . revenue from property 
should be recognised as lawful profit."
From the Shatalin Plan for reforming the Soviet economy, 
quoted in The Economist, September 15th, 1990.
Shatalin may have been right. Democracy has been described as the least bad 
political system yet devised. So might a market economy yet be the least bad 
economic system, despite the many faults described in this paper. Economists of 
Eastern Europe especially seem eager to assign profits a very much larger role in their 
economic systems. When it is suggested that markets have also many disadvantages, 
they may display some irrtpatience with which one can well sympathize. It seems that 




























































































kinds of interference with personal liberties many of which may be much less 
justifiable. They want to try market economies, at least, and to enjoy even the 
freedom to learn from being wrong —  if that is how things turn out.
So far, my discussion has not paid special attention to individual freedom as a 
value in itself. In line with the work of virtually all economics, I have concentrated 
solely on the allocation of resources. This may be leaving out some things which are 
very important. For one thing, much of what is best in life cannot easily be bought 
and sold, or is devalued by being traded. A specific example of this which aroused 
some interest twenty years ago was blood donation — see Titmuss’ (1970) book and 
Arrow’s (1972) review article. In addition, Hahn (1983) points out that it may not be 
legitimate to judge economic systems only on the basis of the allocations they produce. 
Earlier, Rowley and Peacock (1975) provided an extensive discussion of the 
implications for welfare economics of valuing freedom for its own sake. Similar ideas 
are discussed in Sen (1987, especially p. 50, fn. 22 and pp. 60-65) and also emerge 
in the group of papers presented to the 1987 Conference of the European Economic 
Association by Komai (1988), Lindbeck (1988), and Sen (1988). Earlier Sen tended 
to think of such concern for rights as “non-welfarist” ethics, but I would disagree and 
prefer to speak instead of “extended welfarism.” Otherwise we would be in danger of 
joining those libertarians who always want all individuals’ rights to be valued 
positively, even in a society where it was demonstrably better for individuals to have 
some of their liberty limited. It seems to me that we should value liberty to the extent 
that individuals themselves value it and are also made better off when they experience 
it. For this reason, I prefer to regard desirable liberties as components of individual 
welfare, along with the commodities needed for a good life, and any ethically relevant 
concept of desert, etc.
If liberty is an important part of individual welfare, this makes a considerable 
difference to the way we think of profits. Indeed, suppose that we follow the extreme 
libertarians, or even Rawls, in making liberty a primary value, “lexically prior” to a 
good allocation of resources in our scale of priorities. In this case, on one popular 
interpetation of liberty, a laissez faire economic system becomes an end in itself. 
Profits become justified as an essential part of such a system, with those who earn 
them being entitled to keep them. This, however, seems to me a strange sort of 
morality. Many thoughtful moral philosophers and economists may be willing to give 
considerable weight to individual liberty in a social welfare function, but surely not to 




























































































economic allocation which results. If there is a trade off between liberty and 
distributive justice, the objections to profits raised above may be significantly 
weakened, but not entirely removed.2 Moreover, other concepts of liberty may be 
much more inimical to profit. Did Robin Hood not have the right, or even the duty, to 
help the poor by robbing those whose wealth resulted from undeserved profits?
Indeed, incentive constraints imply that some respect has to be given to 
individual rights anyway. Limiting the extent of tax evasion, black marketeering, and 
other illegal activities in the economy requires a costly tax inspectorate, police force, 
etc. If official controls are too tight, they will either fall into disuse, or will have to be 
backed up by an expensive, intrusive and objectionable bureaucracy. Such constraints 
are already covered, at least implicitly, in our earlier discussion based upon the 
allocation of resources. Nevertheless, I am willing to concede that liberty can be a 
value in its own right, so that the earlier objections to profit may be somewhat 
overstated. In the end, therefore, another reason for firms and their owners to be al­
lowed to keep at least some of their (supernormal) profits is the desire to promote 
freedom from interference fo r  its own sake, rather than because such freedom 
improves the allocations of resources, or because of the more plausible concern to 
reduce the costs of collecting taxes, etc. The case should certainly not be overstated, 
however.
11. Conclusions
There are perhaps two kinds of freedom. Libertarians emphasize one kind, 
which is freedom to choose, without interference by tax gatherers, police officers, etc. 
Others may want to emphasize a different kind of freedom — freedom from poverty, 
hunger, disease, ignorance, homelessness — in other words, the freedom to have the 
basic necessities of modern life. Such freedom is enhanced by a proper allocation of 
resources, both privately and publicly provided. Studying such allocations is the 
subject of economic science, in general, and of welfare economics in particular. And
2Lukes (1990) argues that one cannot really talk about such a trade-off. But his argument does not 
totally exclude the possibility that there are some policies which promote some meaningful concept 





























































































greater freedom to choose has to be set against possible — even likely — decreases in 
people’s freedom to have their basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, health care, etc. 
all met.
This paper has examinated of the role of profits and similar rewards in helping 
to bring about an acceptable allocation of resources. It has argued that this role is very 
much weaker than most economists have claimed in the past. Indeed, most of their 
earlier arguments turn out to be hopelessly inadequate in the face of realistic 
considerations like private information and the consequent need to provide adequate 
incentives to workers and capitalists. It is no wonder that most ordinary people know 
better than to trust what most economists have been telling them. And no wonder that 
many thoughtful people I know regard the profit motive as at best suspicious and at 
worst even obscene.
On grounds of economic efficiency alone, and bearing in mind incentive 
constraints caused by asymmetric information, the best that can be said about profit 
seeking behaviour is that it may provide benefits which trickle down to the general 
population. Such trickling down is by no means assured, however. Increasing 
profits often means shutting down inefficient enterprises, throwing people out of work 
and causing real hardship. In theory it may be possible to compensate those who are 
adversely effected, but this will generally require a great deal of intervention in the 
economic system. In any case, after the necessary incentives for managers, workers 
and financiers have been provided, there is no good reason why they should be 
allowed to retain any additional surplus profit.
In anything like a well functioning economic system, therefore, the ethical case 
for pure profit, as opposed to incentive payments, seems to be exceedingly weak. Of 
course, libertarians may object that I am judging economic systems only by the 
allocations of goods and services which they generate, with no special consideration 
for individual rights. Yet only the most extreme libertarians can claim that my 
arguments have no relevance.
Others may argue that some economic systems have been misperforming so 
abysmally that almost any move toward laissez fa ire  system would be an 
improvement, even though it may create widespread suffering for those who are 
already poor. Yet this seems like a counsel of despair, and it is time that those 




























































































also suspect that even they would want to emphasize the role of incentive payments 
rather than of profits.
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